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A SUI GENERIS APPROACH TO FRANCHISE TERMINATIONS
I. Introduction
Franchising did not achieve real significance until after World War II. In
response to the great upsurge in the automobile and oil industries, businessmen
searched for a new method of distribution readily adaptable to such growth.'
With both its managerial and capital ease, combined with a greater freedom
from antitrust restraints, franchising was certainly preferable to "chain" distri-
bution. This unique business arrangement has lived up to its promise. Fran-
chising now accounts for over $90 billion in sales annually or around 15% of
the gross national product.'
The increasing prominence of franchising in our economy has warranted
a corresponding increased scrutiny of the practices used by franchisors. A special
concern to the franchisee is the termination of a franchise or a failure to renew
an existing franchise agreement. Serious questions have been raised as to whether
certain suspect policies of the supplier are being implemented through the
dealer's fear of losing his franchise.' Coupled with this coercion element are the
equities to be considered in cancellation. The franchisee, while investing size-
able amounts of money and assuming direct responsibility of the local operation,
often finds himself in default through a contract provision about which he was
in no position to bargain with the more powerful supplier.4 A resulting termi-
nation often means both harsh financial loss and years of work negated for the
dealer.
This narrow issue of franchise termination has given rise to the correspond-
ing problem of fashioning legitimate remedies. Major considerations are: (1)
whether state or federal legislation should control the area, (2) whether the
Federal Trade Commission can adequately handle the problems of franchising,
and (3) whether franchising should be treated sui generis or dealt with on
general contract principles. Regardless of what form the regulation takes, an
analysis of franchising reveals that special steps must be taken to preserve its
economic dynamism.
II. State Legislation
A. Need for Regulation
There are three major types of franchises: (1) those mainly concerned
with distributing the franchisor's product, (2) those concerned with distributing
a way or method of doing business, and (3) those concerned with establishing
a manufacturing or processing plant. Fast food restaurants and gas stations are
1 Brown, A Bill of Rights for Auto Dealers, 12 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 757, 777 (1971).
2 Lightman, Economic Aspects of Trademarks in Franchising, 14 IDEA 481 (1971).
3 Shell Oil Company v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973). Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Rubenfeld, 72 Misc. 2d 623 (Civ. Ct., Queens Co. 1972).
4 15 G. GLICKMAN, BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS: FRANCHISING § 10.09[l] at 10-81 (1974)
(hereinafter cited as GLICKMAN).
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the two most common examples of the first situation. Within this group it is
important to distinguish between situations where a franchise represents the
dealer's entire business (service station) and where it comprises only part of his
larger operation (a hardware dealer with several different franchised products).
This difference can be essential in the process of bargaining for the franchise.
The gas station dealer has little leverage to mold the franchise agreement terms,
whereas the small retailer can always rely on competing products if he finds the
terms onerous. It is the dealer who exercises such little power in negotiating the
termination clauses of a franchise who needs protection. Accordingly, the
majority of applicable state legislation is passed with such a franchisee in mind
and for purposes of this discussion will be the one meant by the term franchisee.
To the franchisor, a franchise is a license coupled with certain restrictions
designed to enforce either uniformity or minimum standards of service.5 To the
franchisee, however, it is more than merely bargaining for marketing and distribu-
tion; it is tying himself to the keystone of the franchising relationship: the
franchisor's reputation. The dealer not only invests sizeable income and years of
work, but also assumes high risks and direct responsibility, all in exchange for
the goodwill associated with a separate business over which he exercises minimal
control. This initial inequity can easily give rise to abuses appearing at a later
stage. Arbitrary or unjust termination is perhaps the harshest of these since it
so often results in severe economic loss despite the goodwill the franchisee may
have contributed to the operation. The franchisor with his dominant economic
position can stipulate conditions that place the dealer in constant danger of
default.6 For example, some agreements are so severe that they state that
whether termination is appropriate should be left to the supplier's discretion.
The excesses of such lopsided bargaining are demonstrated by Loew's Inc. V.
Somerville Drive-In Theatre Corp.' where the court would have allowed a
termination motivated by "sheer perversity."8 Generally, then, franchise agree-
ments provide for short notice, include omnibus clauses giving rise to default, and
stipulate that any failure by the franchisee to meet the conditions of the contract
must be remedied to the franchisors' satisfaction.9
There is no question that these practices are being employed by suppliers:
the annual turnover of gas station dealers based on insolvency, terminations, and
failure to renew varies from 25-40%." This high rate of failure is understand-
able considering that no common law cause of action exists for unjust termina-
tion or failure to renew. 1 This is accentuated by the fact that most courts only
require that usual contract procedures be observed and often ignore the inequal-
ity of bargaining power. 2 A concern over a lack of remedies available to dealers
is largely responsible for the current state regulations of terminations and failures
5 Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
6 Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 Tax. L. R!v. 650, 662 (1971). For
a typical contract for a car dealer see GLIcKMAN, supra note 4, § 11.02 at 11-2.
7 54 N.J. Super. 224, 148 A.2d 599 (1959).
8 Id. at 234, 148 A.2d at 605.
9 GLICKMAN. supra note 4.
10 Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEx. L. Rv. 650, 655 (1971).
11 Brown, A Bill of Rights for Auto Dealers, 12 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rv. 757, 777 (1971).
12 Division of Triple T Service, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 720, 726, 304
N.Y.S.2d 191, 198 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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to renew. Indeed, one court at least felt compelled to call on the New York leg-
islature to enact laws ameliorating the franchisees' position.'8
B. Inadequacy of Uniform Commercial Code
Many writers have advocated that the unconscionability provision in UCC
§ 2-302 be adopted to prevent unjust terminations.1 Since courts, however, are
reluctant to find per se unconscionable conditions in a franchise agreement there
has been little success using UCC § 2-302." Division of Triple T Service Inc. v.
Mobil Oil Corp.'" exemplifies this recalcitrance by the courts. The court not only
rejected a finding of per se unconscionability but also adhered to a strict contract
analysis of the franchise relationship.'
This application of contract analysis to franchising reflects the most per-
vasive problem in the area. The UCC employs contract principles based on the
assumption that the parties are in an equal position to bargain for the "thing"
to be exchanged. Its tests of good faith and unconscionability are not designed
to take into account situations where there is an already existing imbalance in
bargaining power. 8 As long as the courts lack an appreciation of this, the effect
of the UCC on terminations will probably be negligible. 9
C. Responsiue State Statutes
Amelioration of this lack of remedies can be found in several new state
statutes enacted to protect franchisees. Significantly, these statutes do incorporate
an awareness of the special nature of a franchise and provide safeguards for the
franchisee that go beyond mere contract principles.
There are two major types of state legislation dealing with franchising:
(1) those requiring full disclosure to the franchisee' and (2) those regulating
termination.2' This discussion will concern the latter.
Presently, twenty-two states have limited the franchisor's power to terminate
by demanding that "good cause" or some equivalent be demonstrated by the sup-
plier to justify termination.2 2 Generally, these statutes also include provisions
that prohibit threats of termination, allow franchisees to seek a temporary in-
13 Id. at 733, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 204.
14 For - thorough discussion of the UCO being applied to franchising see, Gellhorn, Limi-
tations on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise Cancellations, 1967 Duam L. J. 465
(1967); Hewitt, Good Faith or Unconscionability-Franchise Remedies for Termination, 29
Bus. LAw. 227 (1973).
15 Sinkoff Beverage Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 51 Misc. 2d 446, 273 N.Y.S.2d 364
(Sup. Ct. 1966).
16 60 Misc. 2d 720, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
17 Id.
18 Hewitt, Good Faith or Unconscionability-Franchise Remedies for Termination, 29
Bus. LAW. 227, 235 (1973).
19 Id. at 232.
20 A discussion of full disclosure legislation is beyond the scope of this article but see,
Franchise Regulation: An Appraisal of Recent State Legislation, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rv.
529, 538 (1972).





junction restraining termination, require sufficient notice be given before termina-
tion, allow a reasonable amount of time for the dealer to cure a default, and
entitle the franchisee to receive fair market value for any supplies on hand at
the time of cancellation. 3 One important point, which will be developed later,
is that these statutes significantly vary from the Automobile Dealer's Day in
Court Act.24 That federal act was initially considered to be a magna carta for
automobile dealers since it purported to ban arbitrary terminations by car manu-
facturers." The courts, though, have strictly construed the "bad faith" re-
quirement.26
Automobile dealers, facing this high burden, have had little success in mak-
ing out "unjust cancellation." In contrast, the state laws offer more compre-
hensive protection since the franchisor must demonstrate his reasons for terminat-
ing a franchise. This difference is vital since the dealer is usually reluctant to
pursue a lengthy, expensive suit against the supplier when the burden of proof
is on him. This change marks an important step towards realizing the special
problems of franchising that cannot be dealt with in a traditional manner.
D. Constitutional Validity of State Statutes
1. The Contract Clause
While this new legislative remedy may appear to be a panacea to franchisees,
some recent court decisions have questioned its constitutionality.2 The problem
of retroactivity as proscribed by the contract clause of the Constitution is
presented in Globe Liquor Co. v. Four Roses Distillers Company.", A recent
Delaware law provided that franchisors could not "unjustly terminate a fran-
chise ' or "unjustly fail or refuse to renew a franchise."" ° In Globe Liquor, Four
Roses had issued a franchise to Globe Liquor to distribute Four Roses' products
in Delaware. The contract called for expiration one year after inception. With
a month to go in the agreement, the supplier notified the dealer that it did not
intend to renew the franchise; Globe Liquor sued for damages and an injunc-
tion under the state Franchise Security Law.3 The Delaware Supreme Court
held that the subsequently enacted statute created a "substantive change in the
rights and obligations under this contract" and was therefore invalid under the
contract clause of the Constitution. 2 The First Circuit dealt with this same
issue in Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co." and held that Puerto Rico's new Dealer's
23 Id.
24 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1970).
25 Id. preamble.
26 Freed, A Study of Dealers' Suits Under the Automobile Dealers' Franchise Act, 41
U. DET. L. J. 245 (1964).
27 Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 423 F.2d 563 (1st Cir. 1970), vacated, 400 U.S. 41 (1970);
Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co. 368 F. Supp. 1401 (1974); Globe Liquor Co. v. Four Roses Dis-
tillers Co., 281 A.2d 19 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971).
28 281 A.2d 19 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1971).
29 DELAWARE CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2552(g) (Supp. 1970).
30 DELAwARE CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2552(h) (Supp. 1970).
31 DELAwARE CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2553(a) (Supp. 1970).
32 281 A.2d at 21.
33 423 F.2d 563 (1st Cir. 1970), vacated, 400 U.S. 41 (1970).
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Contract Law,3 4 prohibiting unjust terminations, gave rise to a constitutionally
impermissible retroactive change of contractual obligations. 5
These cases suggest that state legislation may not bring immediate relief to
existing franchises. It is encouraging, though, that both the Delaware Supreme
Court in Globe Liquor and the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Fornaris held
that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague or arbitrary."
2. The Preemption Doctrine
Preemption has also appeared as a possible constitutional limitation on state
protective policies. Shell Oil Company v. Marinello7 decided by the New Jersey
Supreme Court and Mariniella v. Shell Oil Company's decided by the District
Court of New Jersey illustrate this present dilemma. A comparison of the reason-
ing applied to each of these two cases reviews the alternative judicial responses
-to New Jersey's recent franchise termination statute.
The case involving Frank Marinello, decided by the New Jersey courts, con-
cerned the interpretation of a lease of premises and a dealer agreement entered
into between Shell Oil Company and a dealer. Since 1959 these two parties had
consistently done business, but in 1972 Shell notified Marinello that it intended
to terminate the franchise. Marinello filed for an injunction to stop the termina-
tion, while Shell countered by filing a summary dispossess complaint to have the
dealer removed from the premises. The trial court made three important de-
terminations: First, the Franchise Practices Act did not apply to previously
executed agreements and thus avoided any contract clause questions; 9 second,
there was an implied covenant in the agreement on Shell's part not to terminate
without good cause;4" third, Marinello had substantially performed his obliga-
tions under the agreement.4 Of equal importance, though, was the trial court's
realization that the parties did not bargain as equals and that such an imbalance
should be taken into account when determining whether a termination is made
without good cause.42
The state Supreme Court reiterated this imbalance between the dealer and
supplier in its affirmance: "where there is grossly disproportionate bargaining
power, the principle of freedom to contract is nonexistent and unilateral terms
result. In such a situation courts will not hesitate to declare void as against
public policy grossly unfair contractual provisions which clearly tend to the injury
of the public in some way.'41
This reliance on a state's public policy was not without precedent. In
34 Laws 75, 1964 Laws of Puerto Rico, 4th Sess., at 231 (approved June 24, 1964).
35 423 F.2d at 567.
36 281 A.2d at 22, 423 F.2d at 568.
37 120 N.J. Super. 357, 294 A.2d 253 (1972), aff'd, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974).
38 368 F. Supp. 1401 (D.N.J. 1974), appeal granted (3d Cir. 1974), (appellant's brief
on file in NomRE DAME LAWYER office).
39 120 N.J. Super. at 369-370, 294 A.2d at 260.
40 Id. at 375-376, 294 A.2d at 263.
41 Id. at 379, 294 A.2d at 265.
42 Id. at 375-376, 294 A.2d at 263.
43 63 N.J. at 408, 307 A.2d at 601.
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deTreville v. Outboard Marine Corp,4 the Fourth Circuit held that the com-
mon law of South Carolina anticipated the safeguards contained in UCC §§
1-203 and 2-309. Here the termination of a dealer who for nine years had been
a franchisee with Evinrude was void as against the "good conscience" of the state
even though the agreement had given broad unilateral termination powers to the
franchisor.45 Thus, even though the new statutes may be delayed due to retro-
activity considerations, the courts may utilize the argument that such statutes are
a codification of existing public policy in the state.
However, in a case' with similar facts, involving Frank Marinello's brother,
William, the New Jersey District Court made it clear that this same New Jersey
Franchise Practices Act " was void under the Supremacy Clause of the Consti-
tution" because Congress had already expressed its intent to fully regulate the
area of trademark infringement and unfair competition."
The Lanham Act controls trademark practices.5" One provision states that
the holder of a federally registered mark has exclusive rights to its use.5 A
franchise which involves a trademark generally consists of a licensing arrange-
ment whereby the holder of the mark permits another to employ his mark but
does not give up the exclusive right to its use. When the specific period of the
license expires or when the agreement is terminated, the trademark reverts back
to the holder. 2
While trademarks are concededly regulated by Congress, the intent of the
Act is to deal with "deceptive and misleading use of marks."5 This is an en-
tirely different concept than either the bargaining status of the parties or any
resulting coercion that might result from such an imbalance in bargaining which
is the concern of the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act. Since preemption of
state legislation by federal law is essentially a question of Congressional intent,"
this difference of subject matters between the two statutes is vital. "Clearly the
aligned state and federal enactments must deal with the same subject for
Congress to be able to manifest an intent to supersede the state's exercise of its
power in that area." 5
Yet, even if the statutes should be considered as dealing with an area
regulated by Congress, it is still doubtful that they should be preempted. Out of
the many preemption cases resulting from labor law and civil rights enactments,
the Supreme Court has stated that the test for state law preclusion is not so much
primary purpose but whether "any state regulation ... frustrates the full effec-
44 439 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1971).
45 Id. at 1100.
46 368 F. Supp. 1401.
47 N. J. STAT. ANN. 56:10-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
48 368 F. Supp. at 1405.
49 Id.
50 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (1970). For the intent of the Act see,
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970).
51 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1970).
52 15 G3LICKMAN, supra note 4, § 4.03[3], at 4-33.
53 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970).
54 Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941); Cloverleaf Butter Co.
v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
55 Helmsley v. Borough of Fort Lee, 362 F. Supp. 581, 590 (1973).
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tiveness of federal law .. ."" This is qualified by Schwartz v. Texas," in which
the court held that it "will not be presumed that a federal statute was intended
to supersede the exercise of the power of the state unless there is a clear man-
ifestation of intention to do so."s Thus, even applying the test of whether the
state legislation interferes or impairs federal superintendence of the area, 5
preemption is inappropriate since Congress never intended to deal with franchise
terminations. Moreover, state laws dealing with franchise terminations do not
in any way hinder the rights given to a trademark holder by the Lanham Act.
The Franchise Practices Act is designed not to qualify a franchisor's rights to his
trademark upon termination but rather regulate the process or relationship that
may give rise to an unbridled power to terminate. The trademark with all its
rights granted by the Lanham Act is different from the "process" used in licens-
ing and terminating the use of the mark.
Similar economic legislation by states in areas that are in fact predominantly
regulated by Congress has been upheld. This only adds credence to the theory
that state franchising laws should not be preempted since they deal with an area
left open by Congress. The recent case of R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors
Company60 holds that "[t]he power of the states to legislate in the field of
economic regulation is not to be proscribed in the absence of a clear showing
of a conflict with federal policy."'" The California Court of Appeals reasoned
that the history of the Sherman Antitrust Act clearly showed that Congress did
not intend to preclude any parallel state efforts to control unfair competitive
practices.62
Comity between state and federal laws received support from the Supreme
Court in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. v. Ware.6" The Court
held that where a state has developed a strong policy of protection from economic
pressures on wage earners that such a policy should prevail if it does not con-
flict with federal regulation. 4 This spirit of cooperation is in keeping with the
concept of federalism previously enunciated by the Supreme Court.6"
Indeed, two recent decisions of the Supreme Court, Goldstein v. California66
56 Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971); Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132 (1963).
57 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
58 Id. at 202-03.
59 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Grinnell Corporation v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449, 454 (1st Cir.
1973).
60 Cal. App. 3d 653, 112 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Ct. App. 1974).
61 Id. at 664, 112 Cal. Rptr. 592.
62 Id. at 660, 112 Cal. Rptr. 589.
63 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
64 Id. at 139-40.
65 In Oregon-Washington R.R. Co. v. State of Washington, 270 U.S. 87, 101 (1926),
the Supreme Court stated that an area where the police power of the states is generally attrib-
utable should not be preempted unless Congress has affirmatively filled the area. Reiterated
in 315 U.S. 148, 169, "[olur duty to deal with contradictory functions of state and nation, on
any occasion, and particularly when one or the other is challenged by private interests, calls for
the utmost effort to avoid conclusions which interfere with the governmental operations of
either."
66 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1973), "Similarly, it is difficult to see how the concurrent exercise




and Kewanee Oil Co. u. Bicron Co.," have been extremely conciliatory towards
states participating under their police powers in the control of areas traditionally
considered left to Congress. Since Congress has not been directly involved with
franchise legislation these principles of comity militate all the stronger for a
tolerance of state franchise regulation.
Indeed, Judge Coolahan in his first Mariniello opinion s did not men-
tion preemption. He decided that it was not the common law of New Jer-
sey to require a franchisor to show just cause in terminating or failing to renew
a franchise agreement. This decision that the state law did not mandate just
cause in termination is defensible since it did precede the New Jersey Supreme
Court's affirmance in the companion Marinello9 case. Yet after the state
Supreme Court decision, the second Mariniello opinion 7" completely ignored
a discussion of the Erie doctrine. With there then being no question as
to the common law policy of New Jersey, the district court decided instead that
the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act was in fact being applied to this franchise
and therefore void to the extent that it interfered with the Lanham Act." Thus,
not only does the preemption argument in its substance appear inappropriate, but
the manner in which it was utilized may be seriously questioned as to its com-
pliance with notions of comity and federalism. Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari to Shell's direct appeal from the New Jersey Supreme Court's
decision defining the state's public policy appears more consistent with such
notions.72 It is suggested then, that before state remedies are effective, the courts
need to expand their notions of franchising from those of mere contract to a
realization of the special substantive principles created by the franchise rela-
tionship itself.
III. Federal Activity Towards Protection of Franchisees
A. Proposed Federal Legislation
While it does not appear that state franchise legislation regulating termina-
tion procedures of suppliers is preempted by any existing federal law, it cannot
be seriously argued that Congress, given the expansive construction of the Com-
merce Clause, would lack the power to legislate in the area. Though nothing yet
has been enacted in this area, several franchise practices bills have been pro-
posed.' It is important to realize that these proposals are not considered as
amendments to the Lanham Act, but instead as approaches to another substantive
area of the law. Again there are two major types: those dealing with full dis-
closure and those concerned with fair termination provisions. While it is beyond
67 94 S. Ct. 1879, 1891 (1974), held: "However, since there is no real possibility that
trade secret law will conflict with the federal policy favoring disclosure of clearly patentable
inventions partial preemption is inappropriate."
68 1973-1 Trade Cas. 74,547 at 94,405.
69 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973).
70 368 F. Supp. 1401 (1974).
71 Id. at 1406.
72 42 U.S.L.W. 3460.
73 H.R. 13628, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. Rep. No. 91-1344, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.(Nov. 13, 1970); S. 3844. 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. 2399, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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the scope of this discussion to thoroughly analyze these bills, an examination of
some provisions shows a strong similarity to the state statutes. A bill proposed by
Senator Hart would require good cause to terminate a franchise agreement and
also would provide that the franchisee receive fair compensation for any equip-
ment and inventory on hand at the time of termination 4 Both of these con-
cepts are incorporated in state statutes dealing with termination. 5
The most recent proposals in the area, S. 1694 and H.R. 16510,8 have met
with stiff criticism from both the Federal Energy Administration and the oil
companies." Both bills provide a federal cause of action for certain cancellations
or failures to renew by oil suppliers. Even when based on justifiable reasons, the
oil company must give ninety days' written notice. For impermissible termina-
tions, the dealer may sue for actual and punitive damages as well as an injunc-
tion."' Oil dealers feel federal legislation is necessary to counter many of the
pressures exerted on them by the oil companies. While the burden of making
out just cause lies with the supplier, there is little chance that the law will serve
as a shield for incompetent dealers since the dealer must still initiate the proceed-
ings. Regardless of their relative merits, the bills do at least indicate a Con-
gressional awareness that abuses exist and that current safeguards as found in the
antitrust laws are not adequate.
B. Autonobile Dealer's Day in Court Act
A forerunner of these proposed bills and the strongest federal analogy to
parallel state franchise regulation is found in the Automobile Dealer's Day in
Court Act, 9 hereinafter referred to as ADDCA. Passed in 1956, this statute was
designed to remedy unfair termination practices resulting from the imbalance of
bargaining power between car manufacturers and their dealers. 80 The Act
requires good faith on the franchisor's part both in termination and failure to
renew situations."' While the manufacturer may still indulge in tactics of en-
couragement, persuasion, or urging, the bill specifically prohibits the use of any
coercion or intimidation."2
Most of the litigation concerning this use of coercion by manufacturers has
been disappointing to the dealers. Courts have been very strict in deciding what
constitutes illegal coercion. 3 Complicating the dealer's remedy is the fact that
the burden to make out the violation is on the franchisee. The impracticability of
a dealer maintaining a long, expensive suit against a major car manufacturer
coupled with such a high quantum of proof required to show lack of good faith
frequently results only in frustration. State franchise regulations, however, address
74 Senator Hart's bill was rejected by Sen. Jud. Com. S. 1967, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
75 See note 21 supra.
76 BNA ANirrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (No. 681), A-25 (Sept. 24, 1974).
77 Id. at A-26.
78 Id. at A-25.
79 70 Stat. 1125 (1956); 15 U.S.C. 1221-25 (1970).
80 Id. preamble.
81 15 U.S.C. 1222 (1970).
82 15 U.S.C. 1221(e) (1970); U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4596 (1956).
83 Freed, A Study of Dealers' Suits Under the Automobile Dealers' Franchire Act, 41
U. DET. L. J. 245 (1964); 15A GLIcKmAN, supra note 4, § 13.0314], at 13-24.
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themselves to this problem by allocating the burden of showing good cause for
termination to the franchisor," a notion based on the fact that the supplier is in
a better situation to demonstrate motives in cancelling a dealer.
Yet, the actual effect of ADDCA can be measured accurately only by the
more subtle influence it has had on automobile industry practices." Since the
Act allows federal courts to determine the propriety of certain terminations, an
impetus developed on the part of manufacturers to devise internal grievance
procedures."0 This way the franchisor builds his argument that he has acted in
good faith by attempting to work out any problems within his own structure."T
Fortunately, such a change is not purely superficial. It does in fact provide an
appeal mechanism for the dealer without engaging the costs and time involved
with court action.
ADDCA also contradicts the notion that the Lanham Act preempts state
franchise laws. The auto industry is based entirely on the concept of trade-name
distribution. Yet, Congress has seen fit to impose sanctions on a manufacturer
who does not bargain in good faith with his dealer. Such legislation is not aimed
at regulating trademark infringement but rather at policing the nexus between
supplier and dealer. If preemption is really pertinent to this new legislation by
states, then its proper role would only be in regard to possible conflicts with
the Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act."8
C. Federal Trade Commission Activity
The FTC has also exhibited significant concern over franchising practices.
In F.T.C. v. Texaco, Inc.," the Supreme Court held that the purpose of § 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act was to "combat in their incipiency trade
practices that exhibit a strong potential for stifling competition."' The Court
found that while ultimate decisions concerning what is unlawful competition
rests with the courts, FTC determinations are entitled to great weight.9 In
Texaco, the FTC had found that Texaco had used its "dominant economic
power" to coerce dealers into purchasing tires, batteries, and accessories (TBA)
from a tire company with whom Texaco had a compact.9 2 This finding reflects
the FTC's appreciation of how a supplier's power is often employed to achieve
illegal ends. There is support, then, for the notion that franchising misconduct is
of such import that it falls within the jurisdiction of the FTC to police unfair
competitive practices.
Many of the policy considerations involved in the state legislation concern-
ing terminations are in fact shared by the FTC as indicated by the current case
84 See note 21 supra.
85 15 GLCKMAN, supra note 4, § 9.01[9], at 9-11.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 15 U.S.C. § 1225 (1970), "This chapter shall not invalidate any provision of the laws
of any state except insofar as there is a direct conflict between an express provision of this
chapter and an express provision of state law which cannot be reconciled."
89 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
90 Id. at 225.
91 Id. at 226.
92 Id. at 228.
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of Adolph Coors Company v. F.T.C.3 The FTC had ruled that Coors had il-
legally restrained competition by, among other things, using unfair, short-term
termination provisions in its distributors' contracts." The Commission ordered
Coors to cease and desist from making threats of termination without providing
sixty days' notice when cause could be shown and one hundred eighty days' notice
when there was no cause, and to provide an opportunity for prompt arbitration
of issues pertinent to the termination.95
It could be argued that the state legislation passed to control the termination
powers of franchisors is also designed to prohibit the antitrust practices of tie-
ins and resale price maintenance. A look at recent cases shows that the tool
most often used to implement these practices is the dealer's fear of termination.
Ten years ago the court in Susser v. Carvel Corp.98 held that some tying
arrangements were justified to maintain the quality of a franchisor's product.9
This is in accord with the Lanham Act requirement that the quality of a trade-
marked product be continued. Otherwise the holder of the trademark runs the
risk of being considered to have abandoned his rights to the mark.98 "
Nevertheless, the courts have shown that this duty of quality control cannot
be used as a shield to avoid scrutiny for restraint of trade violations. In Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc.,9 the district court held that when there is a per se viola-
tion of the Sherman Act, justification for it is to be construed narrowly, especially
when arising out of the supplier's dominant economic leverage." Thus state leg-
islation such as New Jersey's Franchise Practices Act'e" does not constitute the
first time that the exclusive rights of a holder of a federally registered trademark
have been qualified.
The Supreme Court has decided a series of cases that increasingly show
the extent to which a dominant party can pressure a weaker bargaining counter-
part to carry out the supplier's policies. In United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.," 2
the Court noted that pressure is endemic to many antitrust practices between
supplier and dealer. Even the time-honored principle of refusal to deal, as
enunciated in United States v. Colgate,"3 was declared void when used to ef-
fectuate a restraint of trade. 0' By cutting off retailers who would not abide by
Parke, Davis & Co.'s price schedule, the supplier was only further intimidating
other retailers to comply.
The step from questioning a refusal to deal to prohibiting threats of
termination was made by the Supreme Court in Simpson u. Union Oil Co.' 5
There the Court, consistent with its previous distinctions between normal busi-
93 3 TRADE RE . REP. 20,403 at 20,281 (FTC 1973).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 20,302.
96 206 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964).
97 332 F.2d at 517.
98 15 GLicKmAN, supra note 4, § 4.03[3], at 4-34.1.
99 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 448 F.2d
43 (9th Cir. 1971).
100 311 F. Supp. 850.
101 N.J. STAT. ANaN. 56:10-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
102 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
103 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
104 362 U.S. at 45.
105 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
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ness decisions to terminate based on profit considerations and those based on
effectuating practices violative of the antitrust laws, stated: "[w]e made clear in
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., ... that a supplier may not use coercion
on its retail outlets to achieve resale price maintenance. We reiterate that view,
adding that it matters not what the coercive device is."10
This progressive checking of dominant economic power finally came to
franchising with the case of F.T.C. v. Texaco."7 There these principles of
balance were applied to evaluating the relationship between an oil supplier and a
dealer. The Supreme Court stated that "[t]he sales commission system for market-
ing TBA is inherently coercive."' O'1 This is bolstered by the Court's description
of factors, found in Atlantic Rf.g. Co. u. F.T.C, '9 that make such pressure pos-
sible: "Among the sources of leverage in Atlantic's hands are its lease and equip-
ment loan contracts with their cancellation and short-term provisions.""
It would seem reasonable to suggest, then, that there is ample Supreme
Court precedent holding that coercion resulting from dominant economic power
is at times definitely illegal. Moreover, there has been considerable discussion by
the courts and commentators that terminations are also improper when they
occur after a supplier has been determined to have violated antitrust provisions."'
Thus, the fear of cancellation, often used to both the dealer's and the consumer's
detriment, can only be rectified if the franchisee is secure in knowing that the
franchisor must have good cause to terminate. By putting this qualification on
the supplier's power, the merits of his justification will be examined by the courts,
thereby making it less likely that inherent antitrust violations will comprise the
basis of his excuse." 2
IV. Need for a Sui Generis Approach to Franchising
A. A Fiduciary Relationship
The cases discussed above expressed judicial concern over the ability of the
franchisor to compel the dealer to follow the supplier's dictates, regardless of their
legality. State legislatures share this concern but also deal with the issue of the
goodwill and money a dealer may contribute to a franchisee. Many times the
franchisee is left with nothing even though his operation of the franchise may
have been very successful. In order to properly allocate risks and benefits in
franchising, it is necessary to consider the unique relationship of a franchisee to
a franchisor.
It has been suggested that franchising is an appropriate area of the law in
106 Id. at 17.
107 393 U.S. 223 (1963).
108 Id. at 229.
109 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
110 Id. at 368.
111 Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchernical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1970);
Milsen Co. v. Southland, 454 F.2d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 1971); Wade, Some Antitrust Problems
in Terminating Franchises, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 23 (1969); Selected Antitrust Problems
of the Franchisor: Exclusive Arrangements, Territorial Restrictions, and Franchise Termi-
nation, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 260 (1969).
112 454 F.2d at 366.
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which to find a fiduciary relationship. 3 Since the parties "simply do not
bargain as equals,"'14 the needed protection for franchisees would come as a
result of the franchisor's added duty to the dealer. Indeed, the criteria established
to determine a fiduciary relationship would readily qualify franchising. The ele-
ments necessary are: control or power of one party over another, unequal
bargaining power in establishing the relationship, an imbalance of high risks to
low benefits, and the opportunity for abuse." 5 If a franchise relationship is to be
considered fiduciary in nature, then the usual mandate prohibiting any acts made
in self-preference would govern. This would eliminate many of the pressures
placed on dealers to subscribe to supplier policies even if detrimental to the
dealer and the public. The general counsel of the FTC has endorsed this notion
by stating that "franchisors frequently speak of their relationship with their
franchisees as being one of trust and confidence. It is truly a fiduciary relation-
ship." 1"
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld"7 provides an excellent appraisal of the
franchise business arrangement. Judge Kassoff discussed the need to accept the
franchising arrangement as fiduciary. The court immediately noted Mobil's
dominance and decided that the oil company had used its leverage in a manner
that breached a supplier's duty of good faith.""' Again, this case dealt with a
relationship between an oil supplier and dealer that had lasted for several years.
However, when Rubenfeld, the dealer, refused to go along with Mobil's in-
sistence that he purchase more TBA, he was terminated. The court stressed the
fact that such a dealer was not to be disposed of through normal contract exer-
cises. The dealer stood in a special status to the more powerful oil company and
therefore was entitled to a showing of good faith on the part of the supplier." 9
Both Shell Oil Company v. Marinello". (decided by the state courts) and
hvision of Triple T Service, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp.'" consistently referred to
the arrangement between supplier and dealer as a franchise and rejected the view
that it should be considered as an ordinary lease or contract. It was in light of
this essential difference that the New Jersey Supreme Court specifically an-
nounced that the freedom to contract was void as against the public policy of
the state.' This is hardly a new concept in the law. Other areas dealing with
business relationships such as partnership, corporations, and joint ventures have
not been limited to contract law. Rather, in each of these cases the courts have
developed special substantive principles to adequately meet the needs and pur-
113 381 U.S. 357; 393 U.S. at 227, "[t]he average dealer is a man of limited means who has
what is for him a sizable investment in his station. He stands to lose much if he incurs the
ill will of Texaco." See also Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEx. L. Rv.
650 (1971).
114 381 U.S. at 368.
115 Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 Tax. L. REv. 650, 665 (1971).
116 Hearings on the "Impact of the FTC on Small Business" before the Subcom. on Urban
& Rural Economic Development of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 143 (1970), statement by John V. Buffington, General Counsel, FTC.
117 72 Misc. 2d 392, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Civ. Ct., Queens Co. 1972), aff'd - App. Div.
N.E.2d -, 357 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1974).
118 Id. at 406, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
119 Id. at 403, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
120 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973).
121 60 Misc. 2d 720, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191 (1969).
122 63 N.J. at 408, 307 A.2d at 601.
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poses of the relationship. In some areas these common law developments are
now codified into statutory form as in the Uniform Partnership Act, and the
Model Business Corporation Act.
B. Consistency of a Sui Generis Approach with Existing Law
The fact that franchising cannot be sufficiently regulated by traditional
legal reasoning is evinced by the New Jersey Supreme Court's statement that
the freedom to contract pales when in violation of the state's public policy. This
corresponds with the Supreme Court's holding that the right of refusal to deal
is void when coercion is the real motive for that refusal. 23 What is pertinent,
though, is that the state's public policy be reasonable in finding and regulating
such coercive ability. Notwithstanding this, it would appear that current state
legislation is comparable in its analysis of franchising to the federal concept as
established by the Supreme Court and the FTC.
Indeed, there is precedent for special qualifications being put on the rights
of a supplier from antitrust considerations: ADDCA and Supreme Court rulings
like Parke, Davis'24 and Texaco."5 Other areas of the law provide analogies
where public policy has curtailed contract freedom, such as UCC § 2-302 and
the banning of "yellow dog contracts" in labor law. Accordingly, current state
legislation tries only to provide similar protection to a specific group of people.
This protection allows dealers to be free from arbitrary or unlawfully motivated
terminations. Such a concern is constitutionally substantiated by the grant of
police power to the states to provide for the general welfare of its populace as
held in both Globe Liquor2" and Fornaris."'
Moreover, a sui generis approach to franchising would not interfere with
legitimate termination, whether derived from state statutes or courts. Both state
legislatures and courts recognize that cancellation or failure to renew not con-
nected with tie-ins, resale price maintenance, or bad faith are within the proper
exercise of the franchisor. In fact, the courts have shown considerable tolerance
in allowing terminations based on profit motives, 28 protection of the supplier's
image or that of his product,'29 failure to increase sales,"' and a desire to con-
solidate franchises.m "
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